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Abstract
This paper describes a conceptual model to identify and interrelate
indicators of intent of non-state actors to use chemical or biological
weapons. The model expands on earlier efforts to understand intent to
use weapons of mass destruction by building upon well-researched
theories of intent and behavior and focusing on a sub-set of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) to account for the distinct challenges of
employing different types of WMD in violent acts. The conceptual model
is presented as a first, critical step in developing a computational model
for assessing the potential for groups to use chemical or biological
weapons.
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Introduction 
Proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), most 
commonly defined as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
(CBRN) devices are grave threats to United States (US) national security.1 
Although several domestic and international terrorists and terrorist 
groups have communicated their intent to acquire and use WMD 
including nuclear weapons, explosives have been the weapon of choice.2 
An ongoing concern is identifying indicators that an existing or emerging 
terrorist group intends to expand its arsenal to include CBRN weapons. 
 
The apparent preference for conventional weapons (explosives) by violent 
groups is understandable. Explosives are a proven technology with known 
outcomes, generally require only basic knowledge of chemistry and 
relatively easy-to-obtain materials and instructions to manufacture, and 
can be acquired through criminal and other networks. They have the 
additional benefit of creating a significant visual and psychological impact 
beyond damage or destruction of their target. In contrast, WMD are more 
difficult to manufacture, acquire, and use, and their outcomes are less 
certain.3 However, opportunities may arise that significantly reduce the 
                                                     
1 Although explosives have been included in some definitions of WMD, for example, 
the definition used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation which includes any 
explosive or incendiary (bomb, grenade, rocket having an explosive or incendiary 
charge of more than four ounces, missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of 
more than one-quarter ounce, mine of device similar to any of the devices described), 
they are considered conventional weapons not requiring the same type of prohibitions 
as CBRN for use in state-on-state armed conflicts. US Department of Defense, “Joint 
Publication 1-02” in DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, vol. 14, 
November 8, 2010 (as amended through February 15, 2016), (Arlington, VA: US 
Department of Defense, 2010), available at:  
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf; United Nations Security Council 
Commission for Conventional Armaments: Resolutions Adopted by the Commission 
at Its Thirteenth Meeting, August 12, 1948, and a Second Progress Report of the 
Commission (New York, NY: United Nations, 1948), available at:  
http://repository.un.org/handle/11176/332321?show=full; As quoted in United 
Nations. 2012. The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945–1965. UN Publication 
A/67; L.28. New York, NY: United Nations Office of Public Information. US Congress, 
“Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in 18 U.S.C. 2332a (Washington, D.C.: US 
Government Publications Office, 2011); NSPD-17/HSPD 4, “National Strategy to 
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” December 2002 (unclassified version), 
available at:  https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-17.html. 
2 Federal Bureau of Investigation. Weapons of Mass Destruction. Last modified 2017. 
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/wmd/wmd_faqs; Gary A. 
Ackerman, More Bang for the Buck: Examining the Determinants of Terrorist 
Adoption of New Weapons Technologies (London, UK: King’s College, 2014), 
available at:  https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/more-bang-for-the-buck-
examining-the-determinants-of-terrorist-adoption-of-new-weapons-
technologies(992afd2a-bdeb-46b2-8cb7-cd29d77ebd64).html; McCormick, “Terrorist 
Decision Making,” 473-507. 
3 James JF Forest, “Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terrorism,” 
Journal of Strategic Security 5, no. 4 (2012): 51, available at:  
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1193&context=jss. 
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challenges of acquiring WMD, such as discovery of a state actor’s cache of 
chemical or biological weapons. For example, roadside bombs used 
against US forces in Iraq in 2003 contained Iraqi-produced chemical 
weapons abandoned after the Iran-Iraq war two decades earlier.4 
 
The challenges WMD pose for non-state actors suggest that factors 
different from those associated with conventional weapons are likely to 
affect consideration of WMD as part of a terrorist group’s strategy. As 
advances in science and technology further reduce obstacles to successful 
execution of a WMD attack, it is increasingly important to understand why 
a group would commit to acquisition or production and use of WMD and 
what indicators would signal movement toward such a commitment. 
 
Chemical and biological weapons are sufficiently different from 
radiological and nuclear weapons to warrant separate analysis. For 
example, compared with radiological and nuclear devices or weapons, 
chemical and biological agents and weapons are easier to conceal, the 
materials needed to produce them are relatively easier to acquire, and a 
chemical or biological weapons (CBW) program requires less financing 
and expertise to establish.5 The knowledge required to perform biological 
and chemical science also shares more in common than that required for 
radiological and nuclear science, which may have implications for 
recruitment and efficient application of expertise. Like radiological or 
nuclear weapons, even low concentrations of CBW can create panic and 
fear.6 However, because discovery of a chemical, biological, or radiological 
attack may not occur immediately, heightened panic and fear about the 
spread of the agent or material can ensue.7 Previous analyses of attempts 
to acquire or use CBW–while useful–have not resulted in a practical 
framework to identify indicators that a group may present a high risk for 
                                                     
4 Eric Schmitt, “ISIS Used Chemical Arms at Least 52 Times in Syria and Iraq, Report 
Says,” New York Times, November 21, 2016, accessed January 24, 2017. 
5 NATIBO, “Biological Detection System Technologies Technology and Industrial Base 
Study: A Primer on Biological Detection Technologies,” in Book Biological Detection 
System Technologies Technology and Industrial Base Study: A Primer on Biological 
Detection Technologies, (City: North American Technology and Industrial Base 
Organization, 2001); Andrea A. Nehorayoff, Benjamin Ash, and Daniel S. Smith, 
“Aum Shinrikyo’s Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Development Efforts,” Journal of 
Strategic Security 9, no. 1 (2016): 35-48, available at:  
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1510&context=jss. 
6 K. Ganesan, S.K. Raza, and R. Vijayaraghavan, “Chemical Warfare Agents,” Journal 
of Pharmacy and Bioallied Sciences 2, no. 3 (2010): 166, available at:  
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3148621/. 
7 There is an incubation period for biological agents (G.G. Onishchenko et al., 
“Bioterrorism: A National and Global Threat,” Herald-Russian Academy of Sciences 
C/C of Vestnik-Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk 73, no. 2 (2003): 127-35, as excerpted in 
Appendix D of Proceedings of Terrorism: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Improving 
Responses: U.S. - Russian Workshop Proceedings. Washington, D.C.: The National 
Academies Press (2004). 
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acquiring and using CBW.8 This article presents a framework for CBW 
intent–a CBW Intent Model. 
Previous Use of CBW by Individuals and Groups 
Chemical or biological weapons are not a recent phenomenon. As early as 
1000 BC, the Chinese used arsenic smoke against enemies. Both World 
Wars saw experimentation and use of chemical and biological weapons 
(for example, WWI: Germany’s use of anthrax to infect Russian horses, 
chlorine and mustard gas use by Germany early in the war and by Britain 
late in the war; WWII: Japan’s experimentation with and use of cholera 
and other biological agents against Chinese cities).9 
 
With few exceptions, CBW also are generally not the sole weapon 
considered by a group. Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic religious sect that 
released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995, tried unsuccessfully to 
acquire and manufacture nuclear weapons and researched other weapon 
technologies such as lasers and microwaves while running chemical and 
biological weapons programs.10 The arsenals of armed militia groups in 
the United States have included both conventional weapons (for example, 
assault rifles and bombs) and CBW (ricin by the Minnesota Patriots 
Council; potassium cyanide by The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of 
the Lord).11 Attacks perpetrated by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham 
                                                     
8 Jerrold M. Post, “Group and Organizational Dynamics of International Terrorism: 
Implications for Counterterrorist Policy,” in Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 
eds. Paul C. Wilkinson and Alaisdair M. Stewart, (Aberdeen, Scotland: Aberdeen 
University Press, 1987); Jerrold M. Post, Keven G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, “The 
Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk 
for Terrorism,” Studies in conflict and terrorism 25, no. 2 (2002): 73-100, available 
at:  http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/105761002753502475; Jonathan 
B. Tucker and J. Pate, “The Minnesota Patriots Council (1991),” in Toxic Terror: 
Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. 
Tucker (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000). 
9 Gerard J. Fitzgerald, “Chemical Warfare and Medical Response During World War 
I,” American Journal of Public Health 98, no. 4 (2008): 611-25, available at:  
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2376985/; Thomas J. Johnson, “A 
History of Biological Warfare from 300 B.C.E. to the Present,” American Association 
for Respiratory Care, available at:  
http://www.zarcommedia.com/index.php/research-documents/13014.html; Jeffrey 
K. Smart, “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective,” in 
Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, chap. 2, eds. Frederick R. Sidell, 
Ernest T. Takafuji, and David R. Franz (Washington, D.C.: TMM Publications, 1997), 
available at:  http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/medaspec/ch-
2electrv699.pdf; C.N. Trueman, “Chemical Warfare and World War Two,” in The 
History Learning Site, accessed May 30, 2016, available at:  
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/chemical-warfare-and-
world-war-two-2/. 
10 David E. Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo (1995),” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use 
of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2000). 
11 Ackerman, More Bang for the Buck; Tucker and Pate, “The Minnesota Patriots 
Council (1991)”; Jessica E. Stern, “The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord 
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(ISIS) have included chlorine gas and mustard gas as well as advanced 
conventional weapons (for example, assault rifles, surface-to-surface 
rockets, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guided weapons).12 
 
CBW are also often instrumental to achieving specific objectives for which 
they are especially well-suited, such as targeting individuals or debilitating 
but not necessarily killing victims. They have been used for both political 
and criminal purposes.  For example, ISIS used CW to slow down and 
demoralize Iraqi forces advancing on Mosul, the Rajneeshees 
contaminated food at several restaurants to affect the outcome of a local 
election, VX agent was used to murder Kim Jong-Nam, a disgruntled 
employee poisoned the food of his co-workers, and ricin was used to 
murder a Bulgarian and in an attempt by an individual to poison a spouse 
in a child custody battle.13 
 
Although individuals have perpetrated many of the documented attacks 
using chemical or biological (CB) agents, groups are the focus of the 
model. So-called lone wolf attacks are more likely to have a criminal 
purpose such as extortion or revenge and be one-time events.14  Groups are 
more likely to have access to the resources needed to develop an organic 
CB capability. Because groups have at least two members, there are also 
more opportunities to observe indicators or trip wires such as expertise of 
group members, intercept communications, or infiltrate the group.15  
                                                     
(1985),” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). 
12 Raja Abdulrahim, “Islamic State Accused of New Chemical Weapons Attack in 
Syria,” Wall Street Journal (2015), available at:  
https://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-accused-of-using-chemical-weapons-
in-syria-1440353562, “Conflict Armament Research, Dispatch from the Field: Islamic 
State Weapons in Kobane” (London, UK: Conflict Armament Research LTD, 2015), 
available at:  http://www.conflictarm.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Islamic_State_Weapons_in_Kobane.pdf; Schmitt, “ISIS 
Used Chemical Arms”; Kristina Wong, “ISIS Used Chemical Weapons against the 
Kurds, U.S. Officials Say,” The Hill (2016), available at: 
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/269551-isis-used-chemical-weapons-against-the-
kurds-us-officials-say; Barbara Starr and Nicole Gaouette, “U.S. Bombs ISIS 
chemical weapons plant,” CNN Report, September 13, 2016, available at:  
http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/13/politics/isis-chemical-weapons-plant/. 
13 “Kim Jong-Nam death: Two women charged with murder,” BBC News.com, 
accessed March 1, 2017, available at:  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
39124439; Schmitt, “ISIS Used Chemical Arms”; W. Seth Carus, “The Rajneeshees 
(1984),” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000); W. Seth Carus, 
“Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900,” 
(Working Paper, February 2001 Revision. Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, 2001), available at:  
https://fas.org/irp/threat/cbw/carus.pdf. 
14 Carus, “Bioterrorism and Biocrimes.” 
15 Patrick D. Ellis, “Lone Wolf Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An 
Examination of Capabilities and Countermeasures,” Terrorism and Political Violence 
26, (2014): 211-225. 
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Previous examinations of chemical and biological weapons use cases have 
suggested several underlying factors that could indicate openness or intent 
of a group to include CBW as part of its arsenal:16 
• Little or no concern over public opinion about a group’s tactics or 
results 
• History of violence resulting in high casualties; an escalatory 
pattern of violence 
• Sophistication or innovation in weapons or tactics 
• Willingness to take risks 
• Charismatic leadership 
• Sense of paranoia and grandiosity 
• Defensive aggression 
• Ideology supporting use of unconventional weapons or tactics to 
accomplish group goals (apocalyptic, religious). 
Because previous work did not provide an organizing framework for the 
factors nor analyze comparable groups that did not attempt to acquire or 
use CBW, these factors have unknown diagnostic use for distinguishing 
between groups inclined or not inclined toward use of CBW. For example, 
charismatic leadership is often a valued characteristic in non-terrorist 
groups and organizations. Additionally, personal attributes, such as 
charismatic leadership or paranoia and grandiosity, are difficult to identify 
correctly without specialized training, a broad range of data from extended 
observations or measurement, or both.17 Moreover, individuals may 
express the same attribute in several ways. Paranoid individuals, for 
example, can be stubborn and argumentative or aloof and withdrawn.  An 
organizing framework should improve identification of intent to acquire 
and use CBW. 
 
                                                     
16 Reviews include a 1994 study of incidents of CBW terrorism in 26 countries since 
World War I (Harvey J. McGeorge, “Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Analyzing 
the Problem,” The ASA [Applied Science & Analysis] Newsletter 42 (1994): 1, 13-4). 
(As cited in M. Leitenberg, “An Assessment of the Biological Weapons Threat to the 
United States,” White Paper prepared for the Conference on Emerging Threats 
Assessment: Biological Terrorism, Institute for Security Technology Studies, 
Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH. pp. 7-9. 2000), available at:  
http://www.equipped.org/bioterror_leitenberg.htm, in-depth historical case studies 
of 12 groups or individuals who sought to acquire or used CBW agents between 1945 
and 1998; Jonathan B. Tucker, “Lessons from the Case Studies,” in Toxic Terror: 
Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. 
Tucker (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), and a comprehensive survey of all 
known instances of bioterrorism incidents between 1900 and 1990; Carus, 
“Bioterrorism and Biocrimes.” 
17 David C. Funder, “Personality,” Annual Review of Psychology 52 (2001): 197-221, 
available at:  
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.psych.52.1.197. 
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Development of the Model 
Development of the CBW Intent Model relied on research on terrorism 
and violence, case studies, reviews of known and suspected use cases, and 
scientific models of behavior and intent. Reviews of research on terrorism, 
political and criminal violence, the ideology and dynamics of terrorist 
groups, radicalization, and group organizational processes that support 
terrorist operations provided a foundation for understanding the 
motivations of individuals and groups, and the circumstances associated 
with terrorism and with attempted and actual use of CBW.18 
Two theories from social and organizational psychology–the Theory of 
Planned Behavior and Expectancy Theory–inform the model.19 These 
theories hold that choice among behavioral alternatives–such as use of 
violence and type of weapons–is influenced by beliefs related to available 
behavioral alternatives and the expected consequences of attempting and 
executing the behaviors.20 
                                                     
18 Ackerman, More Bang for the Buck; McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” 473-
507; Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context”; Maya Beasley, 
“Terrorism as Social Movement Tactic Theory, Mobilization” in Protecting the 
Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-
Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for 
Counter-Radicalization and Disengagement, Multi-Disciplinary White Papers in 
Support of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-WMD, eds. Laurie Fenstermacher et al. 
(Wright-Patterson AFB, USA: Multi-Agency and Air Force Research Laboratory, 
2010); Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 
(1981): 379-99; Murat Ozer, “The Impact of Group Dynamics on Terrorist Decision 
Making,” in Understanding Terrorism: Analysis of Sociological and Psychological 
Aspects (Amsterdam Netherlands: IOS Press, 2007); Benjamin Ginsberg, “Why 
Violence Works,” The Chronicle of Higher Education (2013); John Horgan, 
“Discussion Point: The End of Radicalization?,” University of Maryland September 
28, 2012, available at:  http://www.start.umd.edu/news/discussion-point-end-
radicalization; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Individual and Group 
Mechanisms of Radicalization,” in Protecting the Homeland from International and 
Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root 
Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-Radicalization and 
Disengagement, eds. Laurie Fenstermacher et al. (Wright-Patterson AFB, USA: 
Multi-Agency and Air Force Research Laboratory, 2010); Gordon H. McCormick and 
Guillermo Owen, “Security and Coordination in a Clandestine Organization,” 
Mathematical and Computer Modelling 31, no. 6 (2000): 175-92; Marc Sageman, 
“Small Group Dynamics,” in Protecting the Homeland from International and 
Domestic Terrorism Threats, eds. Laurie Fenstermacher et al. (Wright-Patterson 
AFB, USA: Multi-Agency and Air Force Research Laboratory, 2010). 
19 Icek Ajzen, “The Theory of Planned Behavior,” Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes 50, no. 2 (1991): 179-211; Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein, 
“Attitude-Behavior Relations: A Theoretical Analysis and Review of Empirical 
Research,” Psychological Bulletin 84, no. 5 (1977): 888-918; Victor H. Vroom, Work 
and Motivation (New York, NY: Wiley, 1964). 
20 The definition of rationality varies across different disciplines. The most common 
definition is from economics and arises from the Theory of Rational Choice which 
holds that individuals make choices that maximize utility without the constraints of 
time or effort (Howard Rachlin, “Rational Thought and Rational Behavior: A Review 
of Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox,” Journal of the Experimental 
Analysis of Behavior 79, no. 3 (2003): 409-12). Bounded rationality was proposed to 
account for the frequent observation that humans often rely on heuristics to satisfice 
rather than maximize utility given constraints on time and effort (Herbert A. Simon, 
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In the Theory of Planned Behavior intention is the immediate precursor of 
behavior, and intention follows from “beliefs about [a] behavior’s likely 
consequences (perceived outcomes), about normative expectations of 
important others (social/group norms), and about the presence of factors 
that control behavioral performance (moderating factors).”21 In 
Expectancy Theory, behavior follows from the expectation of reward 
associated with choices among alternatives.22 Intent to perform a specific 
behavior is based on the expectancy (belief) that a level of effort will lead 
to the intended performance (perceived capability), the perceived 
instrumentality of the performance to achieve a desired outcome 
(instrumental to the desired end), and the desirability of the outcome (end 
state value). These principal components of the two theories are, in turn, 
affected by background factors such as overarching beliefs, values or goals, 
individual characteristics such as intelligence, religion, experience, 
culture, knowledge, and external factors such as opportunity and 
resources.  
 
The CBW Intent Model builds upon the principal components and 
background factors that comprise the Theory of Planned Behavior and 
Expectancy. It proposes that the intent of non-state actors to use violence, 
commit terrorist acts, and employ specific tactics and weapons is a choice 
among behavioral alternatives.22 The choice can have a rational basis—to 
achieve an objective—or can represent a means of self-expression.23 Once 
                                                     
“Rational choice and the structure of environments,” Psychological Review 63 
(1956): 129-138.) The use of rationality in the discussion here comes from 
psychological science which defines a rational decision as a deliberative or planned 
versus emotional one based on perceptions or beliefs versus “facts.” (Ajzen, “The 
Theory of Planned Behavior,” 179-211; see also Arie W. Kruglanski, “The Psychology 
or Terrorism: ‘Syndrome’ Versus ‘Tool’ Perspectives,” Paper presented at the NATO 
Advanced Research Workshop on Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of 
Terrorism, Castelvecchio, Pascoli, Italy, September 14-18, 2005), and which 
corresponds to the notion of bounded rationality. Both disciplines recognize that 
decisions based on cognitive effort may not necessarily be, or appear, logical. 
21 Ajzen, “The Theory of Planned Behavior,” 438.  
22 McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,”473-507. 
23 A similar distinction between terrorism as an emotional or a rational behavior was 
discussed by Arie W. Kruglanski in “The Psychology or Terrorism: ‘Syndrome’ Versus 
‘Tool’ Perspectives.” From a psychological analysis, terrorism can be viewed within a 
medical (disease) model as a “syndrome” with internal causes—such as personality 
traits that predispose an individual to become a terrorist—and external causes, such 
as disadvantaged status of one’s ethnic, religious or other group or political 
oppression. It can also be viewed as a “tool,” one of several means by which to achieve 
a goal. The model presented in this article deals primarily with rational decisions to 
use violence and CB weapons to achieve objectives rather than the factors underlying 
violence as a form of self-expression. There is evidence that the motivation of some 
al-Qaeda operatives to attack the United States and the West is based in Islamist 
ideology, which directs adherents to wage jihad against takfir (nonbelievers and non-
Muslim governments) (Erick Stakelbeck, The Terrorist Next Door: How the 
Government Is Deceiving You About the Islamist Threat (New York, NY: Regnery 
Publishing, 2011)). However, a more in-depth exploration of the psychological factors 
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the decision to engage in violence is made, options exist regarding how 
actors express the violence.24 Individual, social, and political factors—
including those represented in the Theory of Planned Behavior and 
Expectancy Theory—social interaction processes, and available resources 
(human, financial, logistical) influence and shape the options selected.25 
The CBW Intent Model incorporates individual influence through group 
leaders, group dynamics, organizational processes, opportunity, and 
openness to novel ideas and technology.26 Knowledge of common factors 
underlying behavioral choices and terrorist behavior should improve 
identification of factors unique to the propensity to use violence and 
unconventional weapons such as CBW. It should also signal when there is 
increased risk of a non-violent group becoming violent and opting for 
CBW. 
 
Radicalization is often a key antecedent of terrorism.27 However, while 
extreme beliefs may precede violent behavior, not all who hold radical or 
                                                     
related to violent behavior as self-expression is beyond the current scope of this work. 
McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” 473-507.  
24 Ginsberg, “Why Violence Works”; Gary A. Ackerman, Victor Asal, and R. Karl 
Rethemeyer, “Toxic Connections: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of 
Unconventional Weapons,” in START Research Review 2009, eds. Gary A. Ackerman 
and Matthew Rhodes (College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism), available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2012.648156. 
25 Luis de la Corte, “Explaining Terrorism: A Psychosocial Approach,” Perspectives on 
Terrorism 1, no. 2 (2010), available at: 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/8/html. 
26 Daniel C. Feldman, “The Development and Enforcement of Group Norms,” 
Academy of Management Review 9, no. 1 (1984): 47-53, available at: doi: 
10.5465/AMR.1984.4277934; Verlin B. Hinsz and James H. Davis, “Persuasive 
Arguments Theory, Group Polarization, and Choice Shifts,” Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin 10, no. 2 (1984): 260-8, available at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0146167284102012; Irving L. Janis 
and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and 
Commitment (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1977); Serge Moscovici and Marisa 
Zavalloni, “The Group as a Polarizer of Attitudes,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 12, no. 2 (1969): 125; Wendy Wood, “Attitude Change: Persuasion and 
Social Influence,” Annual Review of Psychology 51, no. 1 (2000): 539-70, available 
at: http://www3.psych.purdue.edu/~willia55/392F-'06/Wood-Influence.pdf; 
Renate Mayntz, “Organizational Forms of Terrorism: Hierarchy, Network, or a Type 
Sui Generis?” MPIfG Discussion Paper [Electronic], (2004), available at: 
http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/pubman/faces/viewItemOverviewPage.jsp?itemId=es
cidoc:1234217; Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work (New York, NY: 
Harper & Row, 1973). 
27 Randy Borum, “Understanding the Terrorist Mindset,” FBI Law Enforcement 
Bulletin 72(2003): 7-10, available at: 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1227&context=mhlp_f
acpub. Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political 
Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, 
no. 3 (2008): 415-33, available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546550802073367. 
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extremist beliefs will engage in violent behavior or terrorism.28 The CBW 
Intent Model does not explicitly include radicalization as a factor, but 
incorporates several key factors identified as contributing to or indicative 
of radicalization toward violence. 
Antecedents common to radicalization and terrorism include humiliation 
of self or one’s group, a personal connection to a grievance, perceived 
injustice toward the group one identifies with, and dissatisfaction with the 
status quo of political activism.29  
 
Overview of the CBW Intent Model 
The CBW Intent Model is divided into two sections to distinguish between 
factors related to intent to use violence (general violence) and factors 
related to using CB agents or weapons to commit violence (CB violence). 
Just as not all non-violent groups will become violent, not all violent 
groups will choose WMD, and specifically CBW, to commit violent acts. 
However, all groups that use CBW have opted for violence to reach their 
objectives. While analysts may be less concerned about a previously non-
violent group moving toward violence, they need to distinguish groups 
moving toward violence using CBW from groups opting for conventional 
weapons. 
 
Figure 1 shows the composite and individual factors or indicators in the 
model as they relate to individual, group, and organizational processes, 
and external influences on the decisions of a group to use violence and 
specifically CB violence. It also shows the connection between model 
indicators and the Theory of Planned Behavior and Expectancy Theory.30 
None of the composite and individual indicators alone is likely to confirm 
CBW intent. However, observation over time of multiple indicators that 
are consistent with the components of the Theory of Planned Behavior or 
Expectancy Theory and the CBW Intent Model may signal increased risk 
for a group to choose violent behavior to achieve its objectives and CBW as 
the means. 
 
                                                     
28 John Horgan, “Discussion Point: The End of Radicalization?”; Clark McCauley and 
Sophia Moskalenko, “Understanding Political Radicalization: The Two-Pyramids 
Model,” American Psychologist 72, no.3 (2017): 205-216, available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/amp0000062. 
29 Arie W. Kruglanski and Shira Fishman, “Psychological Factors in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism: Individual, Group, and Organizational Levels of Analysis,” Social 
Issues and Policy Review 3, no. 1 (2009): 1-44, available at: doi: 10.1111/j.1751-
2409.2009.01009.x; McCauley and Moskalenko, “Individual and Group Mechanisms 
of Radicalization”; Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review 
of Social Science Theories,” Journal of Strategic Security 4 (2011): 7-36, available at: 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1139&context=jss; 
James Spitaletta, Countering Terrorism, Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (Wright-
Patterson AFB, USA: Multi-Agency and Air Force Research Laboratory, 2013). 
30 Ajzen, “The Theory of Planned Behavior,” 179-211. 
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Indicators were selected using a structured process. The initial set of 
indicators came from CB cases, relevant social science literature, and 
literature on terrorism and violent extremism.31 The strength of support 
for each indicator, its connection to violence or CB violence, and its 
similarity to other indicators determined the indicator’s retention or 
deletion. 
 
 
Figure 1: Composite and individual indicators and their relationship to 
components of the theory of planned behavior and expectancy theory32 
 
                                                     
31 Carus, “Bioterrorism and Biocrimes”; Jonathan B. Tucker, “Toxic Terror: Assessing 
Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons.” (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2000); Margaret G. Hermann, “Assessing leadership style: A trait analysis,” in The 
Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders, ed. by Jerrold M Post (Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 2002) 178-212, available at: 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/45062814/_Jerrold_M._Pos
t__The_Psychological_Assessment_of_Political_Leaders_1.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=
AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1505284601&Signature=bKr6NAf390K%2B
0b29tfbPJ6DlSL8%3D&response-content-
disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DTHE_PSYCHOLOGICAL_ASSESSMENT_O
F_POLITICA.pdf; Edwin A. Locke and Gary P. Latham, “New directions in goal-
setting theory,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 15 (15): 265-68, 2006; 
McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making”; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko. 
Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011); Sageman, “Small Group Dynamics,” 128-37; Ehud Sprinzak, 
“From Theory to Practice: Developing Early Warning Indicators for Terrorism” 
(Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 1998). 
32 Figure created by the authors.   
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General Violence consists of five composite indicators (Leadership 
Influence, Risk/Benefit Assessment of Violence, Intra-Group Dynamics, 
Inter-Group Dynamics, and Organizational Processes) and two individual 
indicators (Aggression Toward the Target Group and Psychological 
Progression toward Violence).   
 
The three individual indicators indicative of a Tendency toward Violence 
using CBW are Social Frames Support Use of CB Weapons, Opportunity to 
Acquire or Use CB Weapons, and Ideology, Values and Goals Support Use 
of CB Weapons. Although each of these three indicators could be 
associated with conventional and other unconventional weapons, only 
CBW-specific instantiations constitute relevant signals of an interest in 
CBW. 
 
The following section describes the indicators associated with general 
violence and CB violence and the behavioral, organizational, and political 
constructs supporting each factor. Examples illustrate how the constructs 
have been observed in or discussed regarding specific, violent groups. A 
small number of examples are about violent criminal organizations. There 
are commonalties across violent groups, whether terrorists, gangs, or 
criminal groups and more is known about the intra-group dynamics of 
gangs and criminal groups than of terrorist groups. Recognized differences 
include the importance of ideology and political objectives to terrorist 
groups and the financial motives attributed to most gangs and criminal 
groups.33 
 
General Violence 
Groups that have decided to use CBW have already opted for violence as a 
means to achieve their goals. Hence, the indicators associated with a 
tendency to engage in violence are necessary, but not sufficient, 
preconditions for CB violence. It is important to acknowledge that prior 
acts of violence may not precede the use of CBW and the decision to use 
violence may occur close in time with the choice of method, especially if 
serendipity favors a particular method. However, for large-scale attacks, 
complex operations, or difficult to acquire weapons or technologies, some 
amount of planning, procuring, and testing prior to an attack would 
improve the likelihood of success. These pre-attack activities may produce 
observable signatures of intended violence and the type of violence likely 
to occur. The composite indicators related to general violence have been 
associated with group and organizational characteristics, processes, and 
functioning in general, and with the operations of terrorist, criminal, or 
                                                     
33 Scott Decker and David Pyrooz, “Gangs, Terrorism, and Radicalization,” Journal of 
Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 151, available at: 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1145&context=jss. 
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political groups that have attempted to achieve their goals through 
violence.  
 
Leadership Influence: Leadership Influences Group toward Use of Violence 
This composite indicator reflects the intentional efforts by influential 
group members to move the group toward violence. Leader characteristics, 
goals, beliefs, and group interactions collectively reflect leadership 
influence on a group. A change in leadership or leadership style may signal 
a change in the group’s direction or activities (for example, toward greater 
violence). While it may not be possible to assess leadership influence in 
emerging groups for which little information exists, the model provides a 
framework for data collection. 
 
Leader’s Ability to Impact or Influence Group Members 
Attributes that comprise a leader’s cognitive abilities, personality, motives 
and values, problem-solving and social skills, and expertise can provide 
insights into a leader’s potential influence on a group. Groups led by 
authoritarian or totalitarian leaders are more vulnerable to radical action 
and violence through polarization and groupthink.34 Among larger 
terrorist groups (for example, al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE]), strategic decisions are typically made by 
top leaders and core members while operational decisions are generally 
made by the leadership of the group’s individual cells.35 Strong, assertive, 
self-confident, and driven leaders who have the trust of the group can 
wield considerable influence over the group and its goals.36 
 
EXAMPLES: Shoko Asahara, the leader of the Aum Shinrikyo 
group that perpetrated the 1995 sarin attack in the Tokyo subway, 
was described as having a monopoly on decision making within the 
group.37  
 
Leadership within the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the 
Lord restricted participation in decision making to core members.38 
 
                                                     
34 Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context.”  
35 Mayntz, “Organizational Forms of Terrorism: Hierarchy, Network, or a Type Sui 
Generis?” 
36 Hermann, “Assessing leadership style,”178-212; David C. McClelland and David H. 
Burnham, “Power Is the Great Motivator,” Harvard Business Review 54, no. 2 
(1976): 100-10, available at: https://hbr.org/2003/01/power-is-the-great-motivator; 
Gary A. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1989), available at: http://corenet.org.pk/js/Gary-Yukl-Leadership-in-
Organizations.pdf. 
37 Nehorayoff, Ash, and Smith, “Aum Shinrikyo’s Nuclear and Chemical Weapons 
Development Efforts,” 35-48; Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo (1995).” 
38 Stern, “The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (1985).” 
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Leadership Beliefs and Motivations 
Over time, the beliefs and goals of influential members will help define the 
group’s values and beliefs and provide focus and direction to its 
activities.39 For political, insurgent, criminal, or terrorist groups, this may 
include influence on decisions about the use of violence and the weapons 
and tactics to employ. Research suggests that the decision to pursue 
unconventional weapons requires patient leadership, willingness to accept 
risk and failures, and a willingness to absorb the associated costs. 
 
EXAMPLE: Osama bin Laden was described as the North Star of 
global terrorism influencing both the terrorist organization he 
founded and its affiliated groups. His anti-Western Wahhabist 
ideology shaped al Qaeda’s strategy to expel US forces from the 
Arabian Peninsula.40 
 
Risk/Benefit Assessment of Violence 
The belief that the benefits of terrorism outweigh the risks may result from 
the perceived instrumentality of terrorism to achieve group ends 
compared with the instrumentality of other approaches or because of 
unmet psychological needs of group members.41 Indicators in this 
composite have been identified as key factors in radicalization toward 
violence. They are also interrelated such that the same antecedent factor 
may be present for multiple indicators. 
 
Dissatisfaction with the Status Quo of Political Activism 
This indicator represents the negative affect associated with the perceived 
ineffectiveness of existing means of political activism. Violent conflict may 
arise if one or more competing groups perceive they can change the status 
quo by fighting or do not believe non-violent means will achieve goals.42 
 
EXAMPLE: The belief that the US government infringes on the 
fundamental rights of citizens and supports the creation of a world 
government influenced the ideology and violent activities of the 
                                                     
39 Locke and Latham, “New Directions in Goal-Setting Theory,” 265-8. 
40 Kate Zernike and Michael T. Kaufman, ‘The Most Wanted Face of Terrorism,” New 
York Times, May 2, 2011, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/02osama-bin-laden-obituary.html, 
accessed February 2, 2017. 
41 McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,”473-507; Vroom, Work and Motivation. 
42 David E. Cunningham, “Who Gets What in Peace Agreements?” in The Slippery 
Slope to Genocide: Reducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Mass Murder, ed. 
Mark Ansley, I. William Zartman, and Paul Meerts (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2011). 
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Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord.43 
 
Perceived Sense of Threat 
Groups may behave aggressively when they perceive threat from another 
group, seek vengeance for harm caused by another group, or are in 
competition with another group for resources that would ensure their 
survival.44 Groups that perceive a high level of threat “are more likely to 
pursue high-risk strategies.”45 
 
EXAMPLES: The Turkish government suspended 11,285 teachers 
in September 2016 over suspected links to the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK) which the government regards as a terrorist 
organization.46  
 
The Turkish government shutdown 15 media outlets and arrested 
the editor-in-chief and other executives of a secular newspaper who 
were accused of committing crimes in support of Kurdish 
militants.47  
 
Amnesty international called civilian casualties and widespread use 
of 24-hour curfews in Kurdish areas that sometimes lasted for 
weeks “collective punishment” of Kurds living in Turkey.48 
 
Personal Connection to Grievances 
Personal grievances or close connections to one’s in-group, which has 
grievances against another group (an out-group), have been identified as 
factors in radicalization.49 In several confirmed cases of biological agent 
use since 1900, the perpetrators were individuals seeking retribution or 
                                                     
43 Stern, “The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (1985).” 
44 Tucker, “Lessons from the Case Studies,” 260. 
45 Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context.”  
46 Al-Jazeera, “Turkey suspends 11,000 teachers for suspected PKK links,” 2016, 
available at:  http://www.aljazeera.com/ (Aljazeera English: Doha, Qatar). 
47 Constance Letsch, “Turkey shuts 15 media outlets and arrests opposition editor.” 
The Guardian (October 31, 2016), available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/30/turkey-shuts-media-outlets-
terrorist-links-civil-servants-press-freedom, accessed April 26, 2017. 
48 Dorian Jones, “Amnesty International Condemns Turkey’s Treatment of Kurds.” 
Voice of America News (January 21, 2016), available at: 
http://www.voanews.com/a/amnesty-calls-turkeys-campaign-against-kurds-
collective-punishment/3155683.html, accessed March 28, 2017; Ceylan Yeginsu, 
“Turkey’s campaign Against Kurdish Militants Takes Toll on Civilians.” New York 
Times (December 30, 2015), available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/31/world/europe/turkey-kurds-
pkk.html?_r=0, accessed March 28, 2017. 
49 McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and 
Us. 
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punishment for others who they believed had wronged them.50 Grievances 
or feelings of exclusion, from opportunities can also be important 
recruitment motivators for armed groups.51 
 
EXAMPLES: A survey of Amsterdam Muslims found that some 
Muslim youth radicalized because of strong feelings that Muslims 
were victims of discrimination.52  
 
Holocaust survivors within Avenging Israel’s Blood (DIN) poisoned 
the bread of Nazi prisoners of war to avenge the deaths of millions 
of Jews.53 
 
Humiliation and Need for Revenge 
Humiliation of a group can contribute to perceived social disparity, a need 
for revenge, and potential extremist behavior.54 Kruglanski and his 
colleagues cite humiliation by one’s enemy and the desire to reciprocate 
the harm caused to oneself or one’s group as motivating forces in 
radicalization.55 
 
EXAMPLE: A history of persecution of the Basques by Francisco 
Franco led to the creation of the radical Basque organization 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) dedicated to armed actions against 
the Spanish government.56 
 
                                                     
50 Carus, “Bioterrorism and Biocrimes.” 
51 Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder, “Disarming Youth Combatants: Mitigating 
Youth Radicalization and Violent Extremism,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 
(2011): 63, available at: 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1141&context=jss. 
52 Marieke Slootman and Jean Tillie, in Processes of Radicalisation. Why Some 
Amsterdam Muslims Become Radicals, eds. I. Weijers and C. Eliarts (University of 
Amsterdam, 2006), available at: https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/75a50bb9-
0e77-4bda-9b77-a240fda72cc8.pdf. 
53 Ehud Sprinzak and Idith Zertal, “Avenging Israel’s Blood (1946),” in Toxic Terror: 
Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. 
Tucker (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). 
54 Sprinzak, “From Theory to Practice”; Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “The Radical Group in 
Context”; Sprinzak and Zertal, “Avenging Israel’s Blood (1946).”  
55 Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn J. Belanger, Anna Sheveland, 
Malkanthi Hetiarachchi, and Rohan Gunaratna, ‘The Psychology of Radicalization 
and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism,” Advances 
in Political Psychology 35 Suppl 1 (2014): 69-93, available at: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.12163/abstract. 
56 Isambard Wilkinson, “Basque Terrorists Driven by Their Hatred of Franco,” The 
Telegraph March 23, 2006, available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/1513769/Basque-
terrorists-driven-by-their-hatred-of-Franco.html. 
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Aggression toward the Target Group 
Groups may behave aggressively when they perceive another group 
threatens them. Perceptions of extreme threats and aggression from 
hostile others may provoke extreme violence in response.57 The intensity 
and basis of negative emotions that drive behavior directed toward others 
will influence a group’s predisposition toward violence against them.58  
 
EXAMPLE: The Christian Identity movement, whose ideology has 
been associated with justification for hate crimes, refers to Jews as 
“children of Satan” and blacks as “mud people.”59  
 
Psychological Progression toward Violence 
Violence is typically not the primary objective of most political, religious, 
ethnic, or ideological groups. Rather, a group’s acceptance of violence to 
achieve goals may develop over time and after unsuccessful attempts using 
non-violent means. Once people believe violence is an acceptable action, 
the form that violence takes becomes a matter of choice, resources, 
capabilities, and opportunity, among other factors. 
 
EXAMPLES: In 1960, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating 
Committee [later named Student National Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC)] staged non-violent student sit-ins as part of the southern 
civil rights movement. By 1963, SNCC criticized the lack of progress 
in civil rights for blacks and demanded immediate reforms. By 
1966, group leadership called for confrontation with whites.60  
 
                                                     
57 Kruglanski, Gelfand, Belanger, Sheveland, Hetiarachchi, and Gunaratna, “The 
Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization”; Tucker, “Lessons from the Case 
Studies,” 260. 
58 Silvan S. Tomkins, “Affect, Imagery, and Consciousness,” in The Positive Effects, 
vol. 1 (New York, NY: Springer, 1962), available at: 
http://testrain.info/download/Silvan%20S.%20Tomkins%20PhD%20Affect%20Im
agery%20Consciousness%20The%20Complete%20Edition%20v.%201%20-
%20v.4%202008.pdf; David Matsumoto, “The Role of Emotion in Escalating Violent 
Non-State Actors to Hostility,” in Protecting the Homeland from International and 
Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root 
Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-Radicalization and 
Disengagement, eds. Laurie Fenstermacher et al. (Wright-Patterson AFB, USA: Multi-
Agency and Air Force Research Laboratory, 2010). 
59 Anti-Defamation League, “Christian Identity,” in Extremism in America, no date. 
http://archive.adl.org/learn/ext_us/christian_identity.html, accessed March 2016; 
Stern, “The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (1985)”; Tucker, “Lessons 
from the Case Studies,” 260. 
60 Stanford University, “Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC),” in 
King Encyclopedia, available at: 
http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_student_nonv
iolent_coordinating_committee_sncc/, accessed July 2015. 
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In its early years, Boko Haram created religious schools to 
propagate the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and establish 
an Islamic state in Nigeria. Some sources attribute its radicalization 
and militancy as a response to the government’s harsh suppression 
of protests and escalating clashes between the police and army and 
Boko Haram.61 
 
Intra-Group Dynamics 
Intra-group dynamics refers to the behavior and formal and informal 
processes within a group that influence its structure and functioning. It 
represents the patterns of stability and change that affect the group’s 
ability to survive and operate effectively. Important processes resulting 
from intra-group dynamics include the norms that influence member 
behavior, group cohesiveness, decision making, and group direction 
usually in the form of group leadership.62 Intra-group dynamics that 
support violence are observed in ongoing behavior and activities (for 
example, whom a group recruits and training provided members) or a 
change in behavior and activity such as increasingly violent rhetoric or 
tactics. 
 
Group Norms Support Violence 
All groups require mechanisms such as structure and assigned or assumed 
roles to guide or control member behavior, maintain order, and protect 
group integrity and survival. Groups create and enforce norms for 
behaviors that are important to the group and to maintain internal 
cohesion and the group’s relationships with other entities.63  Norms also 
help define expected and acceptable behaviors of group members. Cultural 
and religious norms in particular can facilitate effective group functioning 
as they define and reinforce acceptable behaviors for group members and 
express to others what the group believes.64  
 
                                                     
61 Mohammed Aly Sergie and Toni Johnson, “Boko Haram,” Council on Foreign 
Relations 7, no. 10 (2014): 2014, available at: http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-
haram/p25739. 
62 Holly Arrow, Joseph E. McGrath, and Jennifer L. Berdahl, “Small Groups as 
Complex Systems: Formation, Coordination, Development, and Adaptation” 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2000); Kurt Lewin, “Field Theory in Social 
Science: Selected Theoretical Papers” (London, UK: Tavistock Publications, 1952); 
Irving L. Janis, Groupthink 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1972). 
63 Marvin E. Shaw, Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small Group Behavior 3rd 
ed. (New York, NY: McGraw, 1981); Feldman, “The Development and Enforcement of 
Group Norms.” 
64 Feldman, “The Development and Enforcement of Group Norms.” 
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EXAMPLE: Justification provided by groups such as ISIS for their 
violent actions supports both personal and social acceptance of 
violence as rightful.65 
 
In-Group Bias 
In-group bias may result when a group’s ideology shapes perceptions of 
others as similar to the group (us or in-group) or dissimilar (them or out-
group) and helps establish and maintain positive self-image and identity. 
It is evident when one’s group takes precedence over others and makes 
decisions favor of one’s in-group.66 In-group bias may support justification 
for violence against others (for example, enemies seen as the cause of 
problems).67 
 
EXAMPLE: British Muslims recruited by ISIS to fight in Syria 
believe they will be treated as equals, but often find they and other 
foreign fighters are disproportionately used as suicide bombers.68 
 
Closed versus Open Group 
When applied to social groups, the words open and closed refer to the 
permeability of group boundaries and consequent interactions with non-
group members. Open groups have permeable boundaries and few 
constraints on interactions with outsiders. Closed groups have generally 
impermeable boundaries and little interaction with outsiders, and are 
susceptible to groupthink.69 Relatively open groups that become highly 
restrictive about group membership and outside interactions may signal 
increased concern with secrecy concerning group operations. Physical or 
social isolation that insulates a group from societal norms and from notice 
by authorities can lead to reduced concerns about retribution or alienating 
supporters.70 
 
                                                     
65 Emin Dashkin, “Justification of violence by terrorist organizations: Comparing ISIS 
and PKK,” Journal of Intelligence and Terrorism Studies 1 (2016), available at: 
https://doi.org/10.22261/PLV6PE (http://www.veruscript.com/a/PLV6PE/).  
66 Hermann, “Assessing Leadership Style”; Syracuse, NY: Social Science Automation, 
Inc. (1999); Ackerman, Asal, and Rethemeyer, “Toxic Connections.” 
67 Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “The Nature of the Beast: Organizational 
Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks,” The Journal of Politics 70, no. 02 
(2008): 437-49. 
68 Robert Verkaik and John Hall, “Is ISIS running out of suicide bombers? Terror 
group suffers shortage of martyrs after dozens of fighters desert or defect to rival 
militias,” The Daily Mail, (February 9, 2015), available at: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2945724/ISIS-experiencing-shortage-
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69 Gordon Marshall, “Closed Groups and Open Groups,” in A Dictionary of Sociology 
(Encyclopedia.com, 1988), available at: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O88-
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EXAMPLE: The Rajneeshees, a religious cult that poisoned citizens 
in a small Oregon county to influence local elections, controlled 
member interactions with outside others and exercised strict 
control over access to their ranch.71 
 
Radical Subgroups Form within a Larger Group 
Similar characteristics, common interests or backgrounds, and shared 
goals or beliefs are often the basis for subgroup formation. Group leaders 
may create subgroups to perform activities that would otherwise put the 
entire group at risk (for example, a militant subgroup may be responsible 
for handling threats to the larger group) or perform functions that require 
specialized capabilities or expertise such as skunkworks to test weapons 
technologies or a research and development (R&D) function to develop 
new weapons or tactics. Regardless of how they form, subgroups can 
create fault lines and lead to splintering from the larger group.72 
 
EXAMPLES: Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad were 
militant splinter groups from the Muslim Brotherhood.73  
 
The Communist Party of India-Maoist emerged from the 
splintering of several factions of the Leftist movement in India to 
become one of the country’s strongest insurgent groups.74  
 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) created and 
maintained its “Engineering Department” for weapons R&D.75 
 
Polarization and Choice Shift 
Pressure toward uniformity in highly cohesive groups may lead to 
oversimplification of the decision-making process, intolerance of dissent, 
and increased vulnerability to polarization. Group polarization can 
                                                     
71 Carus, “The Rajneeshees.” 
72 Katerina Bezrukova, “Understanding and Addressing Faultlines” (Paper presented 
at the Presented at Workshop on Science Team Dynamics and Effectiveness, The 
National Research Council, Washington, D.C., July 1, 2013), available at: 
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/dbassesite/documents/webpage/dbass
e_083763.pdf; McCauley and Moskalenko, “Individual and Group Mechanisms of 
Radicalization.” 
73 US Department of State, “Terrorist Groups,” in Terrorist Groups, (Washington, 
D.C.: US Department of State, no date), available at: 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45323.pdf. 
74 Akanksha Mehta, “Surge in the Red Tide: India’s Maoist Insurgency,” Counter 
Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Journal of the International Centre for Political 
Violence and Terrorism Research 2 (2010): 1-4. 
75 Gary A. Ackerman, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Development 
of Mortars,” Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 1 (2016): 12-34, available at: 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1501&context=jss. 
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contribute to “extremism, ‘radicalization,’ [and] cultural shifts.”76 
Polarization may occur under several conditions: authoritarian leadership, 
high group cohesion, suspicion of outsiders and outside ideas, time 
pressures to decide on a course of action, few checks on internal power, 
hierarchical decision-making structure, a culture and norms supporting 
consensus and discouraging divergent opinions, and support from 
constituents for more radical activity or positions.77 
 
A choice shift is evident when the final opinion or position of the group is 
different––more positive or negative—from members’ initial positions (for 
example, a historically non-violent group promotes violent means to 
achieve objectives).78 Polarization occurs when the shift is in the same 
direction as members’ initial positions—initial positive (or negative) 
positions are more positive (or negative).79 Polarization would be evident 
when a group tending toward violence becomes supportive and accepting 
of violence. Both types of shifts could signal a progression toward violence. 
 
Deliberations of groups that progress toward violence are difficult to 
observe. Consequently, it is difficult to track changes from initial stating 
opinions or positions. However, several of the groups cited throughout this 
document appear to have operated under conditions conducive to 
polarization and choice shift.   
 
EXAMPLE: Decision making in Aum Shinrikyo and the 
Rajneeshees was completely under the control of the group’s 
authoritarian leaders’ hierarchical decision-making structure. Both 
were closed groups that restricted or controlled contact with 
outsiders, members were generally confined within the group’s 
compound, and leaders experienced time pressures to achieve 
objectives. 
 
Group Experience with Violence 
A “group’s collective experience with violence” may emerge from prior 
involvement of group leaders and members in violent activities and 
                                                     
76 Cass R. Sunstein, “The Law of Group Polarization,” in John M. Olin Law & 
Economics Working Paper No. 91 (2nd Series) (Chicago, IL: The Law School of The 
University of Chicago, 1999), 1; McCauley and Moskalenko, “Individual and Group 
Mechanisms of Radicalization”. 
77 Post, “Group and Organizational Dynamics of International Terrorism”; Jerrold M 
Post, “Differentiating the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Motivations 
and Constraints,” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 8, no. 3 (2002): 
187, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/S15327949PAC0803_02. 
78 Noah E. Friedkin, “Choice Shift and Group Polarization,” American Sociological 
Review (1999): 856-75. 
79 Andrew K. Semmel and Dean A. Minix, “Small-Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy 
Decision-Making,” in Psychological Models in International Politics, ed. Lawrence S. 
Falkowski (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979). 
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recruitment of individuals experienced in violence.80 Violent behavior may 
become the dominant response to a situation if the violence consistently 
leads to desired outcomes.81 
 
EXAMPLE: The Real IRA (Irish Republican Army) actively 
recruited disaffected members from the original IRA who rejected 
the Good Friday accords and the peace process.82 
  
Inter-Group Dynamics 
Underlying all organizational networks are ties that connect network 
members. These may be formal, instrumental ties for mutual benefit such 
as leveraging resources or capabilities or informal ties based on shared 
beliefs, values, interests, or personal relationships. Network connections 
enable information sharing that would otherwise be difficult to obtain, 
including innovations in weapons, technology, and tactics.83 
 
Criminal organizations have historically relied on networks such as family 
and tribal or community relationships to facilitate their illicit activities. 
Criminal groups also develop relationships and marry strategically to gain 
entry into advantageous groups, networks, and locations to which they 
might otherwise not have access.84 Terrorist and violent extremist 
organizations rely on networks to facilitate their missions.85 
 
                                                     
80 Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context.” 
81 Burrhus Frederic Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (Simon and Schuster, 
1953);  
JER Staddon and D.T. Cerutti, “Operant Conditioning,” Annual Review of 
Psychology 54 (2003): 115. 
82Ackerman, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Development of 
Mortars,” 12-34. 
83 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwar: The Future of Terror, 
Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), available at: 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382.html. 
84 Mary D Zalesny, “Networking and the Legitimization of Transnational Crime 
Organizations,” in The “New” Face of Transnational Crime Organizations (TCOs): A 
Geopolitical Perspective and Implications for US National Security, Strategic Multi-
Layer Assessment Occasional Paper (2013); Ed Reina, Vince Garcia, and Isodro 
Lopez, Personal Communication April 28, 2010. Source: Ed Reina (Director of Public 
Safety; Joseph Delgado, Chief of Police, Tohono O’odham Nation Tribal Police), Vince 
Garcia (Tohono O’odham Nation Tribal Police), Isodro Lopez (Vice Chairman, 
Tohono O’odham Nation); Andrew Thomas, Tina Sunday, and Dennis O’Neal, 
Personal Communication December 15, 2009. Source: Andrew Thomas (Chief of 
Police, St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police), Tina Sunday (Lieutenant and Intelligence 
Officer, St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police), Dennis O’Neal (US Border Patrol, Massena 
NY Station, previously on SW US border). 
85 Tricia Bacon, Alliance Hubs: Focal Points in the International Terrorist Landscape, 
8 (2014): 4-26, available at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-
title18/pdf/USCODE-2011-title18-partI-chap113B-sec2332a.pdf. 
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Alliances/Partnerships 
Alliances or partnerships can vary in duration (from short-term tactical or 
transactional alliances to long-term mergers or strategic alliances), extent 
of alliance member interdependence, range and variety of activities, 
ideological similarity, and expected level of trust between members. 
Bay’ah, or pledge of allegiance to a group’s leader by another group, is an 
example of a high-level connection that may lead to a formal merger.86 
Lower level relationships include instrumental tactical and transactional 
alliances, which tend to maintain each group’s independence, involve 
limited activities, and not require a shared ideology or high level of trust.87 
 
Most alliances or partnerships are intentional–or at least convenient–as 
when groups establish a network to leverage resources or share 
information.88 Alliance hubs, which are closely-knit clusters of cooperating 
organizations, are vehicles for organizational learning and dissemination 
of innovations among the hub members.89 For example, dissemination of 
knowledge can occur through demonstration effects by a network member 
currently using new weapons technology.90 Weaker alliance partners may 
adopt the stronger partner’s tactics to improve their effectiveness and 
range. They may also assume a specialized role that benefits all alliance 
members (for example, establishing an R&D program or experimenting 
with new tactics and weapons such as CBW). 
 
EXAMPLE: When the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat 
allied with al Qaeda in 2006 (becoming al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb or AQIM), it adopted al Qaeda’s tactic of suicide 
operations and focused on the high profile targets al Qaeda 
attacked.91  
 
Rivalries 
Rivalries may emerge because of conflicting beliefs, values, or tactics, or 
competition for influence over a population or area (for example, 
competition among the mujahidin groups in post-Soviet occupation 
                                                     
86 Jacob Zenn, “A Biography of Boko Haram and the Bay’a to Al-Baghdadi,” CTC 
Sentinel 8 (2015): 17-21, available at: https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-biography-of-
boko-haram-and-the-baya-to-al-baghdadi. 
87 Defense Intelligence Agency, Human Factors Analysis Center. “Dynamic Group 
Assessment Methodology.” July 2009. 
88 Post, “Group and Organizational Dynamics of International Terrorism”; Post, 
“Differentiating the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism,” 187.  
89 Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle 
against Israel (New York, NY: Random House, 2011). 
90 Letsch, “Turkey shuts 15 media outlets and arrests opposition editor.” 
91 Post, “Group and Organizational Dynamics of International Terrorism.” 
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Afghanistan).92 They may also contribute to radicalization of each groups’ 
members.93 Previously non-violent groups may engage in violence and 
violent groups may explore new tactics or weapons to stand out from their 
rivals. 
 
EXAMPLE: ISIS propaganda has described rival Islamist groups or 
anti-ISIS groups such as Ahrar al-Sham and the al Qaida/Nusra 
Front as apostates and traitors linked to Iraqi Sunni tribal 
opposition to the Islamic State in Iraq.94 
 
Organizational Processes 
Violent groups and terrorist groups must perform tasks necessary for 
group maintenance, support, survival, and growth.95 In addition to 
attracting and recruiting members, groups must also socialize, train, and 
retain members, and organize to accomplish its objectives.96  For example, 
ISIS has specialized functions to oversee finance, security, media, and 
recruitment operations.97  
 
Staffing and Maintaining the Organization 
In addition to recruiting, groups must retain current members who 
contribute operational expertise, training, capabilities, and understanding 
of norms and standard operating procedures. A shift in a group’s 
recruitment, training, socialization, and operational tactics may indicate 
new objectives and an increased risk of violence if the change is consistent 
with support for violent activities.98 The rise in status of group members 
involved in violent attacks may communicate within and outside the group 
that violence is acceptable and is a means to advancement in leadership 
ranks. 
                                                     
92 Sprinzak, “From Theory to Practice”; Post, “Group and Organizational Dynamics of 
International Terrorism.” 
93 McCauley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization,” 415-33. 
94 Alberto M. Fernandez, “Here to stay and growing: Combating ISIS propaganda 
networks,” The Brookings Project on United States Relations with the Islamic World, 
United States-Islamic World Forum Papers (Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C) 
October 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/research/here-to-stay-and-growing-
combating-isis-propaganda-networks/. 
95 Jeyong Jung and Julak Lee, “Organizational Behavior of Terrorist Groups,” Journal 
of Public Administration and Governance 5, no. 2 (2015): 62-77, available at: 
https://doi.org/10.5296/jpag.v5i2.7551. 
96 Marshall, “Closed Groups and Open Groups.” 
97 Gregor Aisch, Joe Burgess, C. J. Chivers, Alicia Parlapiano, Sergio Peçanha, Archie 
Tse, Derek Watkins, and Karen Yourish. “How ISIS Works.” New York Times, 
September 16, 2014. 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/16/world/middleeast/how-isis-
works.html; Armin Rosen, “ISIS is Running an Alarmingly Effective Terrorist State.” 
available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-isis-caliphate-operates-
2014-12. 
98 Ibid, 90. 
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EXAMPLE: Aum Shinrikyo recruited PhD-level microbiologists 
and chemists before the group moved toward chemical/biological 
terrorism.99 
 
Member Characteristics 
To achieve its objectives, a group must recruit individuals with capabilities 
commensurate with task requirements or train them. For groups with an 
interest in or intention to use violence or CBW, attractive recruits will have 
experience with violence and capabilities and experience related to the 
weapons and tactics the group wishes to employ (for example, expertise in 
explosives, chemistry, biology/microbiology, chemical engineering, 
information technology). Groups may present themselves as legitimate 
support organizations to build connections with individuals who are 
vulnerable (for example, because of characteristics or circumstance) and 
more likely to succumb to persuasion.100 Vulnerable individuals may also 
seek out groups for the opportunity to affiliate with peers or individuals 
with whom they self-identify.101 
 
EXAMPLES: Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s recruiting strategy 
targets characteristics specific to its operational needs. For suicide 
bombing, it targets the homeless, disabled, young, and frustrated 
refugees.102 For less expendable and necessary positions, it recruits 
professionals and university students such as journalists for 
propaganda work and engineers to run captured industries.103  
 
Richard Reid, recruited by al Qaeda to bring down a US airline 
flight using explosives hidden in his shoes, was described as 
impressionable by the imam at the mosque Reid attended in the 
UK.104  
 
                                                     
99 Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo (1995).”  
100 Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon L. Cardash, and Andrew J. Whitehead, “Radicalization: 
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113, available at: 
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102 Matthew Schofield, “Islamic State’s Next Recruiting Target: Germany’s Young and 
Vulnerable,” Stars and Stripes (2015). 
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Socialization 
Groups may socialize individuals to radical ideologies that facilitate 
recruitment through social interactions involving family, friends, and 
others important to the individual who support those ideologies.105 Once 
joining a group, new members may undergo secondary socialization to 
familiarize them with the group’s culture, functioning, and structure.106 
 
EXAMPLES: Almost one-quarter of the members of the Italian Red 
Brigades and one-third of the 9/11 hijackers were related.107  
 
Extreme approaches to socialization include the conscription of 
children to become child soldiers in South Sudan and the 
kidnapping and impregnation of women by the Shining Path to 
socialize future soldiers from birth.108 
  
Training 
Unless a group recruits experienced individuals, some training will be 
required to prepare new group members for various operations. A change 
in group strategy from non-violence to violence will require internal or 
external training in how to destroy property and facilities and how to 
injure and kill people.109 
 
EXAMPLE: Hezbollah is known for its sophisticated military 
training camps, which include firing ranges, assault courses, and 
urban warfare sites. The camps provide both basic and advanced 
skills training for recruits and existing members.110 
 
                                                     
105 Mohammed M. Hafez, “The Ties that Bind: How Terrorists Exploit Family Bonds,” 
CTC Sentinel 9 (2016): 15-7, available at: https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-ties-that-
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106 Post, Ruby, and Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context,” 91-92. 
107 Donatella Della Porta, “Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy,” in Terrorism in Context, ed. 
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|Africa (London: BBC News, October 27, 2014) available at: 
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109 Brian A. Jackson et al., “Aptitude for Destruction,” in Case Studies in 
Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups, vol. 2 (Santa Monica CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2005), available at: 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG332.readonline.html. 
110 Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God; Nicholas Blanford, “Look Who’s Training: 
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Innovation in Weapons and Tactics; Willingness to Take Risks 
Group leadership is a key factor in a group’s exploration and adoption of 
unconventional and innovative weapons and tactics.111 Successful 
innovations benefit from leadership that is open to experience and 
information, and willing to take risks that may result in failures. Leader 
risk taking, however, may be constrained by compatibility of the weapons 
system with group ideology and values, the group’s acceptance of the 
leader’s decision, momentum toward adoption (including sunk costs), 
sufficient technical expertise to produce or operate new weapons or 
technologies, opportunity, and access to a safe haven in which to 
experiment with new weapons or tactics.112 
 
EXAMPLE: The Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
designed and built submersible and reusable narco submarines to 
overcome improved detection and interdiction of fast boats by 
authorities.113 
 
Organizational Learning 
Organizational knowledge resides in the rules, procedures, conventions, 
strategies, and technologies around which organizations are structured 
and how they operate.114 It becomes part of collective memory.115 
Organizations acquire information through networks, alliances, or 
partnerships and intelligent failures that provide important diagnostic 
information.116 Learning organizations are well-positioned to innovate. 
 
Conditions that support intelligent failures and organizational learning 
include a focus on process, acceptance or legitimization of failure (such as 
leadership willing to learn from mistakes and not punish risk taking), 
publicizing or acknowledging intelligent failures, training for resilience, 
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113 Michelle Jacome Jaramillo, “The Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) and 
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49-69, available at: 
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committing resources to efforts with uncertain outcomes, and 
incorporating problem solving into the organization’s philosophy or 
ideology.117  
 
EXAMPLE: The Provisional Irish Republican Army has been 
described as having a “culture of learning,” which included the pre-
employment testing of weapons systems, willingness to innovate, 
and institutionalization of after-action analyses of successful and 
failed bombing attacks (for example, gathering post-attack 
information on unexploded ordnance through observers stationed 
at police barriers).118  
 
CB Violence 
Direct observation of group actions suggestive of interest or intent to use 
CBW may be difficult. However, other evidence indicative of intent may be 
available. Technical manuals related to chemical and biological agents, 
equipment to manufacture chemical or biological agents, or receipts for 
the purchase of agents or equipment found at a group’s current or 
previous location all reflect at least an interest in chemical or biological 
agents. The arrest of a group member in possession of such materials, a 
group’s association, partnership with suppliers or users of chemical- or 
biological-related materials, or third-party observations or statements 
would also constitute evidence of interest or intent. The CBW Intent 
Model proposes three indicators as indirect evidence of interest or intent 
to acquire or use CBW.  
 
Social Frames Support the Use of CB Weapons 
Framing refers to social influence on how individuals perceive or interpret 
and react to an object or event.119 Perception of the same event can vary 
considerably depending on the frame in which the event is set. For 
example, a story about police arresting protesters framed by concerns for 
                                                     
117 Based on a recently compiled dataset of incidents of failed and foiled (outside 
intervention) jihadist attempts since 1993 to attack the United States and its Western 
allies, Crenshaw (2016) observed that terrorists may sometimes perceive a failed or 
foiled plot as being successful. Although data do not exist on whether failed or foiled 
attempts were treated by jihadist groups as intelligent failures and part of 
organizational learning, the compiled dataset may contain additional information on 
whether and which groups have other characteristics of a learning organization. 
Martha Crenshaw, “Failed, Foiled, Completed, and Successful Jihadist Plots in the 
United States 1993-2016,” Telephonic presentation to the DHS/START/MINERVA 
and SMA Technical Lecture Series, Washington, D.C., May 31, 2016; Stephen Walsh 
and Paul Whitney, “A Graphical Approach to Diagnosing the Validity of the 
Conditional Independence Assumptions of a Bayesian Network Given Data,” Journal 
of Computational and Graphical Statistics 21, no. 4 (2012): 961-78. 
118 Ibid, 90. 
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the protest turning violent will be perceived differently (more favorably) 
than if the arrests are framed as an example of overly aggressive police 
tactics (less favorably).  
 
Social framing by political, insurgent, and terrorist groups can help justify 
a group’s ideology or behavior and suggest possible responses to an 
event.120 Exposure to internal propaganda, communications from trusted 
others, social media, and the internet can tap deeply held beliefs, increase 
awareness of alternative weapons, tactics, and techniques, and 
communicate direct and subtle messages of acceptable or preferred 
weapons to use against enemies.121 Groups may also stage unconventional 
activities (for example, ISIS videos of the beheading of hostages) or 
employ new technologies to increase media exposure, create propaganda 
for use in recruiting or training, or prompt others to emulate their actions. 
Social frames used by a group to radicalize others may influence lone wolf 
attackers who profess allegiance to a terrorist group.  
 
Within social movements, activists use frames to present themselves and 
their ideas to gain the support of others.122 Frames can convince others 
that their participation is necessary for change to occur.123 They can also 
“highlight specific societal problems and identify the parties guilty of 
creating them.”124 Frames involving CBW can demonstrate how to initiate 
specific change that solves problems.  
 
EXAMPLE: Islamic imagery on websites has included 
combinations of weapons including gas masks to suggest the use or 
potential use of chemical or biological weapons to achieve 
objectives or in retaliation for use by the adversary (see Figure 2).125  
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Figure 2: Social frames can suggest the use of CB weapons126 
 
 
EXAMPLE: ISIS uses at least two propaganda magazines to recruit 
jihadists especially from the West: Rumiyah and Dabiq. Of the two, 
Dabiq uses slick photos of heavily armed fighters and exaggerates 
claims about the group’s terrorist attacks.127  
 
Opportunity to Acquire or Use CB Weapons 
Opportunity represents an important potential situational constraint and 
condition affecting intention toward specific behavioral choices.128 It 
typically arises as an unsought favorable circumstance–a serendipitous 
event. In the context of CBW, opportunity can be a found cache of 
chemical or biological weapons or a new group member with specialized 
skills, knowledge, or connections. 
 
A group can create near or longer-term opportunity by relocating closer to 
an area with a greater variety of resources to leverage. An extremist or 
criminal group may also create and then capitalize on the failures of the 
state to provide protection or services to the populace.129 According to the 
Theory of Planned Behavior, individuals or group members who assess 
there are sufficient resources, opportunity, and few obstacles for pursuing 
specific behaviors would be more likely to attempt the behaviors.130  
 
Others can create opportunity to stimulate interest in weapons or 
technology. Smugglers, organized crime groups, arms dealers, and 
                                                     
126 Combating Terrorism Center, The Islamic Imagery Project, 98. 
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terrorist groups often trade in arms and illegal commodities for profit or to 
establish markets as part of their broader operations.131  
 
EXAMPLE: “ISIL is…reportedly interested in acquiring chemical 
weapons from old Iraqi sites - two bunkers that still contain a 
stockpile of old weapons - which were once Saddam Hussein's 
premier chemical weapons production facility.”132 
 
Group Ideology, Values, and Goals Support Use of CB Weapons 
Some qualitative terrorism analysis has supported the view that groups 
with certain types of ideology are more likely than other groups to engage 
in extreme violence or use unconventional weapons.133 Hoffman has 
observed that religion may be used to legitimize violence against 
opponents.134 Other research, however, suggests that ideology may 
contribute much less in predicting whether a particular group may use 
WMD and, specifically, CBW.135 
 
Whether and how group ideology, values, and goals is related to the use 
and method of violence remains an empirical question which requires a 
more granular analysis. Nonetheless, ideology, values, and goals can 
provide insights into whether a group presented with an opportunity to 
acquire or use CBW would take advantage of it.  
 
A group’s ideology functions partly as an indicant of the group’s identity 
(“this is who we are”) and is important for group loyalty, cohesion, 
acceptance of group norms, and in the selection of potential allies or 
partners.136 Group members who are committed to the group’s ideology 
and values may also be more committed to accomplishing the group’s 
tasks even if it requires violence.137 Group leaders whose beliefs and values 
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support the use of CBW in attacks against the group’s targets can affect 
member acceptance through the strength of their influence over the group, 
through selective rewarding of violent behavior, and with social frames 
that support CBW use. However, groups may resist or reject outright 
weapons or tactics innovations that are not consistent with a group’s 
ideology.138  
 
Because research has not sufficiently addressed the relationship between a 
group’s ideology and the use of CBW, this indicator is a topic for future 
research. Importantly, the level of analysis must distinguish among the 
ideologies of specific groups. The question is not whether groups with 
religious ideologies are more likely to use violence or CBW, but rather 
what about religious (or other) ideologies will influence a group’s actions. 
 
EXAMPLES: Aum Shinrikyo’s ideology included belief in an 
apocalyptic war, which the cult would survive only by arming itself 
with “powerful weapons including biological and chemical 
agents.”139  
 
The ideologies, values, and beliefs of groups such as al Qaeda, The 
Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord, Hamas, and 
Jemaah al Islamiyah support or are interpreted to support or 
justify the use of violence to defend against and defeat perceived 
enemies.140 
 
Application and Future Research 
The conceptual model of CBW intent described in this article is the basis 
for a computational CBW model which analysts can test and apply.141 The 
development and evaluation of the computational model is a critical next 
step for our research program in CBW. Once in computational form, the 
conceptual CBW Intent Model can be empirically evaluated as a statistical 
model for the existence and strength of proposed relationships.142 With 
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sufficient data, interactions among the identified indicators can also be 
evaluated. Formal elicitation from experts leading to quantitative data is 
also available to inform the computational model.143  
Testing the application of the computational CBW model will use readily 
available, processed data, such as those from the University of Maryland 
START Center, historical summaries, and news reporting on groups of 
interest.144 Because parts of the conceptual model correspond with 
activities that occur more frequently than the use of CBW (for example, 
general political violence), it is expected that some parts of the model will 
be more precisely calibrated than others.  Once the computational model 
is developed, it can be used for multiple purposes. First is to identify and 
prioritize indicators to monitor or track intent to use CBW in groups. 
Second, the computational model can be used to quantify the status of 
tracked groups on each indicator to determine their risk for violent acts 
and use of CBW. Finally, the computational model can be used to track 
changes in group status on all indicators to identify change in risk.  
 
Given the potentially large amount of information analysts review daily, it 
is impractical to expect anyone to apply the model as part of daily 
information review without additional assistance. To that end, the 
computational CBW model will be incorporated into a model-based 
analysis software system to address both the scale of the data and the 
complexity of the model. As information related with CBW intent is 
collected, the envisioned computational framework will support 
computational evaluations of the CBW model. Questions to address will 
include whether there are detectable regional variations in the expression 
of CBW intent, and how well the CBW Intent Model–developed 
considering non-state actors–captures state actors’ intent regarding use of 
violence and CBW. The framework for the conceptual CBW Intent Model 
and the approach for developing, testing, and using the computational 
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model map to other settings. Potential applications include general 
political violence, terrorism, and intent of non-state actors to use 
radiological and nuclear WMD. 
 
While the model incorporates indicators for the most important factors 
related to interest and intent to use CBW, we may test other indicators in 
the future to determine their contribution to predicting intent. Future 
research should also include model validation using data sets and case 
studies of a large number and variety of groups. Ideally, the groups should 
vary across factors that can affect group or organizational decisions related 
to size, maturity, structure, founding member beliefs and values, primary 
objectives for existence, membership, leadership, stakeholder influence, 
and geographical location.145 
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